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Healthcare professionals’ and patients’
perspectives on consent to clinical genetic
testing: moving towards a more relational
approach
Gabrielle Natalie Samuel1,2†, Sandi Dheensa3*†, Bobbie Farsides1, Angela Fenwick3 and Anneke Lucassen3,4
Abstract
Background: This paper proposes a refocusing of consent for clinical genetic testing, moving away from an
emphasis on autonomy and information provision, towards an emphasis on the virtues of healthcare professionals
seeking consent, and the relationships they construct with their patients.
Methods: We draw on focus groups with UK healthcare professionals working in the field of clinical genetics, as
well as in-depth interviews with patients who have sought genetic testing in the UK’s National Health Service (data
collected 2013–2015). We explore two aspects of consent: first, how healthcare professionals consider the act of
‘consenting’ patients; and second how these professional accounts, along with the accounts of patients, deepen
our understanding of the consent process.
Results: Our findings suggest that while healthcare professionals working in genetic medicine put much effort into
ensuring patients’ understanding about their impending genetic test, they acknowledge, and we show, that
patients can still leave genetic consultations relatively uninformed. Moreover, we show how placing emphasis on
the informational aspect of genetic testing is not always reflective of, or valuable to, patients’ decision-making.
Rather, decision-making is socially contextualised – also based on factors outside of information provision.
Conclusions: A more collaborative on-going consent process, grounded in virtue ethics and values of honesty,
openness and trustworthiness, is proposed.
Keywords: Consent, Autonomy, Genetic testing, Genomics, Virtue ethics, Patient decision-making, Ethics
Background
Consent has been argued by some to be the founda-
tion of contemporary medical ethics, and a pinnacle
of ethical clinical practice. Underlying consent is the
notion that patients can make autonomous decisions
and that in doing so they are protected, or can
protect themselves, from harm. For consent to be
valid, adequate information must be provided to a pa-
tient about any proposed course of clinical action, in-
cluding its alternatives, benefits and risks.
In some areas of medicine the relationship between
information provision and maintaining patient auto-
nomy are (more) clearly defined, being related to the
goals of care for a particular patient at a particular
time. For instance, for a surgical procedure that has a
clear beginning and end, patients can be informed of
the benefits, risks and alternatives, allowing them to
make an informed autonomous choice. In other areas
of medicine, however, the action for which consent is
sought is less sharp, and disputes remain among aca-
demics and healthcare professionals (HCPs) about
what, and how much information is required to
achieve adequate consent and ensure patient auto-
nomy, especially when the goals of care may be
blurred [1]. Clinical genetic or genomic testing
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provides a good example – particularly broad and
untargeted tests, such as comparative genome hybrid-
isation (‘arrays’), and whole-exome and whole-genome
sequencing. Information about the benefits, risks and
possible outcomes of this testing may be uncertain
and/or only accrue over time. Indeed, the Joint
Committee on Medical Genetics (JCMG) guidance is
acutely aware of these issues, noting within its gui-
dance that being fully informed is not possible in this
setting [2].
In this paper we argue in line with this guidance
that in clinical genetic testing, the desire of HCPs to
maintain patient autonomy and prevent harms has in-
volved too much emphasis on providing information
to patients - the ‘informational’ aspect of consent. We
challenge the idea that in order to make an autono-
mous and informed decision about clinical genetic
testing, patients need to know all the specific
information about the test. An information-loaded
consent framework is neither possible nor useful in
meeting the aim of enhancing autonomous decision-
making in this setting. Rather, without appearing pa-
ternalistic, and without thinking they are harming pa-
tients, HCPs must realise, and convey to patients,
that uncertainty exists in this area of medicine. Not
having, or giving, all the specific information about
genetic testing outcomes does not mean patients are
‘uninformed’.
We also go further and argue that consent should
be viewed as relational, and as an on-going collabora-
tive decision-making process between the HCP and
patient. This process should be based on trustworthi-
ness, openness and honesty, and as such can be seen
as rooted in virtue ethics. The extent to which these
virtues are embedded in clinical decision-making will
thus go some way to tell us about the ethical nature
of the process.
To build our argument, we draw on a set of focus
groups with HCPs working in genetic medicine and a
set of interviews with patients who have sought
genetic testing. We guide the reader through our em-
pirical findings.
Consent in genetic and genomic medicine
To set the scene, we summarise the existing discussions
about consent in clinical genetics highlighting four spe-
cific issues.
First, the predictive nature of genetic information
raises issues about what to test for, when, and whom
to test, for example, the question of whether to test
children, or analyse their already-sequenced genome,
for indications of currently far-off, adult-onset risks.
Second, the innovativeness, and growth, of more
detailed genetic analysis raises questions about the
increasing chances of finding genetic predictions or
diagnoses that are not related to the reason for the
test (so-called incidental findings, or IFs): for ex-
ample, risks for hereditary cancers amenable to risk-
reducing interventions. Specifically, questions arise
about how these might be anticipated and incorpo-
rated into the consent process and even whether they
should be reported if not specifically sought [3–9].
Third, the familial nature of (some) genetic informa-
tion raises issues about whether confidentiality can
best be viewed at the individual or familial level and
whose responsibility (if anyone’s) it is to communicate
risk to at-risk relatives [10–12]. Finally, genetic test-
ing’s often traversing role across research and clinical
practice [13] raises issues about the ‘therapeutic mis-
conception’, and whether patients expect to receive
clinical information from their participation in a re-
search study, or expect that their clinical tests will be
further researched.
Because of the complex issues and implications sur-
rounding genetic testing, genetic HCPs often provide
genetic counselling in the way of education, guidance,
and pre-and post-test information about the risks,
benefits, limitations, and implications of tests (includ-
ing the potential for IFs), as well as data storage and
data usage (e.g., use in quality control or research) [5,
14]. This approach ostensibly facilitates patient con-
sent to genetic testing and is viewed as a positive eth-
ical feature. Indeed, evidence suggests genetic
counselling improves knowledge and decreases anx-
iety, distress and depression [15]. Even so, concern
remains about the lack of feasibility, applicability, or
benefit to patients of receiving all of this information
during the consent process. This is true of genetic
testing in general, but especially relevant to broader
genome analysis [16, 17]. Some HCPs, for example,
understand that patients cannot always be expected
to fully understand the range of different possible re-
sults and implications of testing because the analysis
undertaken can often be open-ended and results un-
certain. Others have gone further, and argued that too
much detailed information can overload patient un-
derstanding [18, 19] and undermine autonomous
choice [20]. Depression, anxiety, or desperation may
lead to incomplete understanding of the information
given [19].
Relational ethics
An emerging critique from the social sciences and
anthropology is a questioning of the informational
aspect of consent [13, 21–29]. Central to these cri-
tiques is a problematisation of the assumption that
patients are autonomous agents who make rational
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choices based on neutral information. There is recog-
nition that autonomy is relational, and factors beyond
information must also be emphasised as relevant to
decision-making. These factors relate to an individ-
ual’s social, cultural, emotional and/or personal or fa-
milial context [22] and include, for example, patients’
expectations of the clinical encounter, the nature and
severity of the illness, and clinician-patient interac-
tions and relationships [24, 30, 31]. Viewing consent
in a way that does not consider the relational aspects
of autonomy leads to an ‘empty ethics’ [24] and strips
the principle of consent away from its social context.
Trust and hope, for example, are perceived as import-
ant factors for decision-making, where trust is seen to
be placed in clinicians, who are viewed as protecting
patients against harm [18, 32]. Interestingly, similar
findings have also been noted in the research/bio-
banking setting, where trust and hope are entangled
in the belief that research will produce (sometimes
personal) therapies in the case of clinical trials [33],
and offer societal benefits by advancing medicine
[34–36]. Regarding practices that combine clinical
practice and research, a survey by Genetic Alliance
UK showed that while 38% of respondents trusted
private companies to do research using their health
data, 80% trusted the UK’s National Health Service
(NHS) to do so [37]. In terms of the research aspect,
the perceived relationship between research and par-
ticipant has been shown to play an important role in
shaping preferences regarding consent [38].
In this paper, we draw on some of the arguments out-
lined so far to propose that it is better to move away
from an approach to consent that places autonomy, and
the need for information, as the central reason for con-
sent in genetic testing. Rather, these should be seen as
equal among other principles to be upheld within a
more relational approach to consent: those of trust-
worthiness, openness and honesty. While HCPs in gen-
etic medicine are, as we will show, to some extent
already adopting such relational frameworks of consent,
many are not and such a framework needs to be ac-
knowledged more extensively and at a more regulatory
level to ensure that all HCPs conducting clinical genetic
tests are aware of best practices.
Our arguments are particularly relevant and timely for
three overlapping reasons. First, HCPs who do not
specialise in genetic medicine, and who may have little
experience with seeking consent for clinical genetic tests,
are being increasingly encouraged by NHS to adopt such
testing into routine clinical practice. We consider it
important that they take a relational, rather than a solely
informational, approach. Second, although unclear
whether and how it might affect clinical genetics/genom-
ics, a recent UK legal ruling (Montgomery vs Lanarkshire),
which states that a doctor must take ‘reasonable care to
ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks in-
volved in any recommended treatment, and of any reason-
able alternative or variant treatments, might mean that
now more than ever, clinicians consider more information
to be better – indeed that without a barrage of informa-
tion about possible outcomes from genomic testing, con-
sent might not be valid. It is important to highlight the
shortcomings of such legal rulings in the practice of clin-
ical genetics/genomics, particularly because of the possible
current and future uncertain predictions it might make.
Third, projects are launching worldwide that combine
research and clinical care and aim to integrate whole
genome sequencing into clinical practice. The UK 100,000
genomes project for example takes an informational ap-
proach to consent, whereby patients are given a 40 min-
two hour appointment, an eight-page information leaflet,
and a five page consent form to sign multiple times. Such
an informational approach to consent runs the risks of
turning future clinical practice into a disclaimer inter-
action that does little to enhance the validity of consent
about unexpected, uncertain or future predictions.
Methods
Methodological rationale
This paper draws upon patient interviews and HCP
focus groups conducted by the second author, SD, as
part of a larger project about consent and confidentiality
in genetic medicine [32]. For this paper, the first author,
GS, analysed the interview and focus group data.
GS was initially unaffiliated with the larger project.
However, with the aim of forging a new collaboration
between SD, AL and AF, GS was given access to conduct
a secondary analysis of SD’s data which related, but was
not directly relevant to, the larger project’s research
questions. Concerns relating to the secondary use of
qualitative data have been documented and include
issues associated with contextualisation and data inter-
pretation [39]. Given these, GS was cautious proceeding
along this path and, indeed, during her analysis, she
experienced many of these concerns. As a result, she
became more affiliated with the original research team,
drawing on their knowledge, experience and interpret-
ation of the data to ensure the findings reflected the data
meaningfully. All data interpretation was thus in
collaboration with SD, AL, and AF to ensure that the
emerging themes represented their experiences, and
were reflective of their views of the data.
Recruitment and sampling
Patients
In 2013, information about the research project was sent
to collaborators in three large UK genetics centres.
These centres posted the information onwards to all
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recent patients seen for genetic testing. Information was
also posted on online support groups for hereditary can-
cers and cardiac conditions. These conditions were
chosen as they are the most commonly seen in genetics
services; there are available risk-reducing interventions;
and because they have an inheritance pattern that means
family members could be at risk—an important consid-
eration because the original project explored confidenti-
ality and family communication. SD conducted 33 semi-
structured interviews with adult participants. Interviews
lasted around one hour. The interview schedule has
been reported previously, and comprised general, open-
ended, and non-leading questions designed around the
research questions and empirical and conceptual litera-
ture [32]. Some of these interviews were not used for re-
analysis: in two the recording failed and SD’s notes were
unsuitable for reanalysis and several participants had not
consented to their data being used in future research.
HCPs
UK HCPs involved in genetic testing were invited to take
part in the research (2013–2015). Recruitment was
purposive, proceeding via presentations at professional
meetings, and emails to heads of departments for dis-
semination to colleagues. Eighty HCPs agreed to partici-
pate (representing n = 14/24 regional UK genetic
services), and 16 focus groups were held. HCPs included
genetic counsellors (n = 37); clinical scientists (n = 16);
consultants in clinical genetics (n = 8); clinical genetics
registrars (trainees) (n = 8); nurses working in a genetics
team (n = 4); fetal medicine professionals (n = 4); family
history coordinators (n = 2); and a nephrologist (n = 1).
Where possible, focus groups consisted of real-life teams
to provide an understanding of the context in which
HCPs work and make decisions. Discussions were facili-
tated by SD, audio-recorded, and lasted approximately
one hour. A detailed account of the methodology has
been reported previously [32].
Data analysis for this study
Transcripts were analysed using aspects of grounded the-
ory methodology. Analysis had two main iterative stages:
(1) description of each transcript, which formed the basis
of the forthcoming abstraction and analysis, and (2)
coding and creating themes. Following (1), two focus
groups with fetal medicine professionals and two with
research scientists were excluded from analysis as these
professionals did not seek consent for genetic tests. One
pilot focus group was also excluded as it had little relevant
data. Twenty-one patients were excluded from analysis for
various reasons including those mentioned above: some
participants had not had a genetic test or had one many
years previous; and one had tested for Huntingdon dis-
eases so did not fit with the profile of the other
participants. Some transcripts contained insufficient or no
relevant data. In the end, 11 HCP focus groups and 12 pa-
tient interviews were retained for analysis. Data were man-
aged in NVIVO.
Analysis was initially microscopic, in that in involved a
line-by-line analysis, with a particular focus on partici-
pants’ discussions of consent and decision-making for
genetic testing. Constant comparisons were made
between transcripts, between patients and HCPs, and be-
tween findings at each stage to those at subsequent stages.
These comparisons facilitated coding, of which there were
three iterative aspects: open coding, axial coding, and
selective coding. Open coding involved labelling meaning-
ful aspects of text, including concepts (the building blocks
of theory and argument) and processes (the evolving and
dynamic actions and interactions between participants,
other people, and their environments, over time). Axial
coding involved categorising open codes—grouping simi-
lar codes and interrogating the way they related to each
other, which helped us to form the arguments underpin-
ning the themes. During this process, we revisited the
transcripts to ensure our emerging arguments reflected
the data. Selective coding involved the integration and
refinement of these arguments [40].
Results
Findings are divided into two sections. First, we draw on
focus group data to highlight HCPs’ efforts to adequately
inform patients to allow them to make decisions about
genetic testing. Second, we use focus group and inter-
view accounts to highlight how, despite this, patients do
not always understand the specifics of the information
provided and, moreover, understanding this information
is not always reflective of, or valuable to, patients’
decision-making. The final discussion section draws
these sections together.
Focus groups with HCPs: How genetic HCPs consider the
act of consenting patients
In this first section we show how HCPs viewed consent as
both being integrated in patient discussions in clinic ap-
pointments and as being the signing of a consent form.
While HCPs placed some value on the signing of consent
forms, ensuring patient understanding of the information
provided prior to testing was considered of paramount
importance.
HCP views on the importance of information-provision for
consent
HCPs understood that patients often arrived at a con-
sultation with little understanding about testing, and
spent much of the consultation explaining the implica-
tions and exploring patients’ views and feelings about
having the test. The consent process was, in this way, an
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integral part of the consultation: ‘its giving them the in-
formation in a way they can understand it enough to
make a decision that’s appropriate for them’ (FG3P1);
‘we spend 45 minutes essentially consenting a patient for
a test...a lot of the time that’s the purpose around the
consultation’ (FG6P3).
This perceived importance by HCPs to adequately
inform patients stemmed from a belief that genetic,
and especially genomic, testing was more ethically
troublesome than clinical investigations in other med-
ical specialities: ‘genetic tests are different [to other
tests] because they give permanent information about
you [and] indications for your relatives, so it’s harder
to see them in isolation, and I think sometimes, not
only the patients, but doctors forget that’ (FG15P5).
Indeed, maybe because of this, genetic HCPs thought
other HCPs might pay less attention to such issues:
FG7P2: there are some people that have taken a lower,
not a lower view, but a less stringent view of consent,
and possibly don’t think about it as much as we do….
FG7P1: I think a GP for example would do perhaps a
battery of tests and wouldn’t think twice probably of
saying, ‘well actually we did an anaemia test but your
blood sugars are up’, whereas we [genetics] would be
[more] worried about finding something else.
Corroborating their strong desire to ensure patients
were informed were HCPs concerns that the ever-
increasing mainstream specialities now ordering genetic
tests might not grasp the ethical implications of such
test results, and as a consequence, patients seen by these
HCPs might not understand genetic testing or its conse-
quences: ‘that’s our greatest anxiety, because genetic test-
ing in the very near future here is going to come online to
other specialists without any genetics support..[..]..where
the whole issue of genetic testing and consent [how best
to reveal] results just doesn’t ever sort of reach conscious-
ness’ (FG13P1). Previous research has also shown genetic
HCPs to have such concerns [5].
Therefore, rather than viewing consent as ‘nothing
more than a set of procedures to be followed’ [18, 41],
HCPs’ emphases were heavily weighted on ensuring
patient understanding of genetic information. They
perceived their ‘ethical awareness’ to be related to the
special nature of genetic information, which stands apart
from other forms of medical data in terms of its per-
manency and familial nature.
HCP views about patients signing a consent form prior to
testing
Given the amount of information they had to convey,
HCPs saw consent forms as sometimes helpful be-
cause they prompted and structured their discussions
with patients. For many HCPs, forms were useful for
documenting consent and creating a necessary sum-
mary of these discussions, in which they had ex-
plained the concept of genetic testing and its
implications for the patient and family members. The
form acted as a reference to what patients were con-
senting to and why: ‘it also gives the patients a kind
of anchoring point as well. That they feel 'alright, this
is where I’m going with this'’ (FG6P1). A signed con-
sent form was also thought to provide some reassur-
ance that HCPs were more protected against any
future potential professional or legal ramifications, al-
though HCPs themselves cast doubt on this assertion:
‘in a way it’s like a legal document but then it’s not
legally verified; it’s for our peace of mind essentially’
(FG101P1). One participant expressed feeling ‘a lot
happier if I’ve got that person’s signature’ (FG16P3).
These findings are in keeping with previous research
highlighting patients’ beliefs that the primary function
of consent forms is to protect hospitals [42].
The consent form also served a more ‘practical’
(FG6P2) purpose by providing documentation about
potential contact of other family members if relevant,
perhaps by other HCPs (‘it’s nice to have it docu-
mented, because when we’re not here and someone
else looks at the file’ (FG8: specific participant inaud-
ible). Such a situation could also arise in the future,
years after the patient had consented to genetic tes-
ting: ‘if…there’s a sample that was tested fifteen years
ago, and no-one has documented any consent about
whether or not that information can be shared…just
looking at things in the long-term, I do think it can be
really important information’ (FG6P1).
A handful of participants placed little value on the
form or the need to complete it before testing. For
them, documenting the decision-making process
between HCP and patient was important, but could
be recorded just as well in clinical notes: ‘we’ve got a
consent form, which we don’t always use to be honest,
but we’ll still document’ (FG7P2). Some HCPs per-
ceived the discussions surrounding consent, rather
than any written documentation, as paramount to en-
suring patients were informed about testing: ‘I think
it is good practice to take written consent, but…it’s
never a substitute … for actually making sure patients
understand’ (FG6P3). Such differences possibly reflected
the use of genetic testing for diagnostic purposes—during
which clinicians may be less concerned with distinguish-
ing genetic testing from any other clinical investigation for
which written consent would not normally be sought—as
opposed to predictive genetic testing, where documenting
consent is considered more ethically appropriate because
of the novelty, complexity and uncertainty of many such
predictions.
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Problems with placing ethical emphasis on the informed
aspect of consent
In this section we question the ethical weight placed
on the informed aspect of consent by looking at three
issues. First, despite HCPs’ efforts to ensure patients
understand the process of genetic testing and its
implications, they observed that patients often left
consultations with limited comprehension. Second,
alongside clinical information, emotional, social and
situational issues also played a prominent, often inter-
twined, role in patients’ decision-making. Third, pa-
tients discussed, and HCPs observed, that clinical
information given during the consultation can be of
limited importance or value to them.
Patients do not always fully understand or retain
information about genetic testing
Despite the attention they paid to ensuring patients were
informed, HCPs expressed concern that sometimes fam-
ilies were still unable to understand information. FG6P3
explained how ‘the majority of patients don’t know
they’ve had a genetic test, even though they’ve signed a
consent form’. Others discussed how patients, even if
they had initially understood information, were later
unable to remember it, which made them doubt the pa-
tient’s level of understanding. Indeed, FG5P3 remarked
that it would be incorrect to assume the information
relayed and explained to patients had been duly consi-
dered: ‘you think you've explained it…they nod at you
nicely...we can't assume that because it's easy for us it's
easy for them. It takes ages...it's just the penny has not
dropped …’. One HCP talked about the consent form as
evidence to remind the patient of their consultation (‘a
lot of them will say “I’ve never been to genetics”, and you
know they have because…you’ve got information in the
file’ (FG8P2)).
Interview and focus group accounts suggested a number
of reasons to account for (potentially) poor understanding
of genetic testing: the complexity of the information pro-
vided; the number of simultaneously-offered diagnostic
tests making it difficult for patients to distinguish or
process the difference between a genetic test and other
non-genetic diagnostic procedures; and patients’ minds
being too focused elsewhere during the consultation, for
example on the emotional roller-coaster of their (or their
child’s) life, to concentrate on genetic testing and its impli-
cations: ‘I do remember signing it; I don’t remember the
talk before I did that. I was quite nervous’ (patient 6).
As such, although nearly all patients spoke about the
importance of being informed (‘information is power…by
knowing things you can make decisions’ (patient 24)), and
while some had spoken with clarity about the consent
process (‘they was [sic] quite good. They explained every-
thing’ (patient 17); ‘she gave me a lot of information’
(patient 10)), their comments corresponded to clinicians’
concerns: that difficulties in understanding meant that
patients did not always leave the consent process fully
comprehending the implications of their impending gen-
etic test(s). For other patients, they might have initially
understood the implications of the test, but could now
not remember them – as patient 9 noted in relation to
consenting to familial sharing of genetic data, ‘I don’t re-
member them saying anything particularly about that’.
This raises concerns about using a one-off information
appointment as a gateway to consent for testing –
something increasingly the case in NHS consultations for
certain familial cancer predispositions, for example.
Consent and the need to consider emotional, social and
situational issues
As touched upon above, in some instances a patient’s
decision to have a genetic test was less based on the
information provided to them, and less a case of them
acting as rational autonomous individuals, weighing up
information devoid of emotional and social context.
Rather, their autonomy was relational: decisions were
embedded in, and their rationality inextricably linked to,
their emotional, cultural or social relationship with the
world around them. The extract below highlights how
HCPs thought for some patients there was ‘so much go-
ing on’ for their families at the time of diagnosis, it was
difficult for them to adjust and consider what they were
consenting to:
FG14P4: …at the time of diagnosis there’s so much
going on…
FG14P3: Yeah, and then once they’re adjusting they
start taking it on board. And we simply, we don’t
necessarily see them at that point do we?
FG14P4: No, no, that seems to be what we’re sort of
identifying here isn’t it, it’s that in the shock or the
trauma of the initial situation people understandably,
are going to be processing information.
FG14P3: And just thinking…what’s wrong with my
child; that’s what their focus is.
Patients corroborated that it was difficult to emotion-
ally process information at the consultation. One noted
that deciding to have the test on a re-visit rather than an
initial visit to the HCP allowed for such emotional pro-
cessing to take place: ‘I think it was probably right that
there was a gap between the two [consultations], to give
you time to process it all [before deciding to have the
test]’ (patient 18). Others noted that because emotional
processing often did not occur until after testing, the im-
plications of a genetic test were not always thought
through even at the time of consent. Patient 25, for
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example, said she had not considered the implications of
genetic testing: the decision was clouded by one she felt
more sure about—to have a risk-reducing mastectomy:
Even though somebody [a HCP] might tell you [the
implications of the genetic test], and I’m sure they did,
you don’t, look past that test. You think “oh yeah I’ll
have a test, so I really should know if I’ve got
something”, but you don’t realise once the results [are
there], then you have to make another decision that’s
far more difficult.
These findings support previous research arguing that
decision-making during consent is not just related to the
provision of information (the ‘information paradigm’
[22]), but also its social context [5, 35].
Values important in patient decision-making
Many of the issues covered in the consent process, and
those summarised on consent forms, were perceived by
some HCPs not to ‘actually matter that much to [the pa-
tients]’ (FG8P4). For instance, HCPs expressed that at
least in some cases the anxiousness that surrounded giv-
ing consent for the familial sharing of information was re-
lated less to concerns about sharing genetic information,
and more to social and personal concerns about sharing
other, more personal, information from medical records.
FG12P3: I’ve only come across one person who’s said
you must destroy this sample…and that …to me it was
kind of a more generalised anxiety rather than specific
to the test that we were doing. I think [for] most
people…it will be something like non-paternity or I had
a termination for social reasons I don’t what anyone to
know…don’t tell anybody. It’s more those kinds of
things that people are most concerned about.
FG12P5: Not about what’s happening to my DNA.
In addition, HCPs explained how patients seemed to
have little concern about the future testing or use of
their genetic material for ‘the benefit of others’: ‘I think
most patients you talk to actually don't have a huge
problem with their information being shared for the
benefit of others and so on. I think it's a minority that
has a problem that gives the public the view that
everyone has a problem…’ (FG3P2). Indeed, as has been
highlighted by others [35, 43], the use of genetic infor-
mation for purposes such as research was viewed posi-
tively (‘I have no worries at all, and any information,
any kind of research, it’s going to help future genera-
tions…and it’s so important’ (patient 12)), and at times,
HCPs felt research was almost assumed by patients to
be happening:
FG12P5: I’ve had lots of people assuming we’re going
to do research on their sample, “are you going to use it
for research then are you?.....”
FG12P8: Some people want us to do research don’t
they?
FG12P5: Yes
FG12P8: And say well why aren’t you?
FG12P5: Keep it, keep it, and do all the research!
Previous research confirms that views about the use of
biological material for research purposes are often not
related to, or based upon the provision of information
during consent. Rather, they reflect a whole raft of
relational and virtuous notions relating to altruism, soli-
darity, trust in medical institutions and clinicians, and a
belief in the welfare state [22, 35].
Indeed, exploring these relational and virtuous no-
tions a little deeper, HCPs and patients seemingly
placed much value on the importance of openness
and honesty in their relationship during the consult-
ation (‘you always tell your patient that's what you're
going to do and you're always transparent about what
you are doing and why you're doing it’ (FG5P1); ‘I
think it's openness. I think if…something hasn't gone
quite ideally…I think if you're honest about it then
they don't feel cheated’ (FG3P1)). This valuing of
openness sat alongside a perceived need for a trustful
HCP-patient relationship (‘I think it’s really important
that your patient feels that they can trust the relation-
ship that they’ve got with you’ (FG16P1)). Trust has
been shown previously to be paramount in any
consenting process [18, 38, 43], and here it was no
different: as Patient 2 noted, patients needed to trust
HCPs to behave in an ethically responsible way: ‘as
long as that conversation is had…we have to trust the
health professional to behave in a professional
manner’.
Discussion
Drawing the findings together
Our findings have shown that HCPs acknowledged, and
patients expressed, the shortcomings of an informational
focus on consent. That is, despite HCPs’ efforts to en-
hance patient autonomy and protect patients against
harms by adequately informing them about the specifics
of genetic testing, situations arise in which patients have
little understanding or memory of the consent process.
Decisions about genetic testing were made in social
contexts enshrouded with emotions and other personal
concerns, and in some circumstances, the information
covered during consent was of little relevance or value
to patients, especially if this information was not directly
related to how the patient considered the goals of his/
her care at any particular time. Our findings thus give
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credence to the notion that consent should be more
than ‘an information-based, intentional act’ [35](page
16), and that failure to embrace the social context within
which decisions are made about genetic testing will lead
to an ‘empty ethics’ [24].
We reiterate previous research that suggests that being
informed about all the possible outcomes of clinical gen-
etic testing is not attainable, and, moreover, not always
reflective of the nature of consent or decision-making
[27, 31]. We also argue that such fundamental issues,
related to placing emphasis on the informed aspect of
consent, cannot be solved – as some propose – by pro-
viding more time for consent [5] or by providing ever
more levels of complex information or technological so-
lutions. Indeed, HCPs noted that they often become ‘tied
up in knots’ (FG7P2; FG12P3) because of the complexity
of options for receiving results (which results to receive;
when; and how) and this chimes with contentions that
more information is not always better [44]. And while
we see merit in proposing various models for ap-
proaching broad consent to genetic testing, as has been
done in the research arena (for example, offering pa-
tients options to choose between types of IFs using ‘tiers’
or ‘bins’ [17, 20],1 these models cannot solve the funda-
mental issues associated with the notion that consent is
broader than the provision of information alone. This is
because of the reliance of these models on the belief that
providing information to patients allows rational autono-
mous individual decision-making.
Instead of viewing consent as the passing on of deci-
sion-making capacity onto a (rational and autonomous)
patient by the provision of information, consent needs
to be seen as an on-going collaborative relational process
in which decision-making is shared between HCP and
patient. While this collaborative relational approach has
been suggested to be appropriate in the specific context of
disclosing genetic test results to patient’s relatives [27, 31],
it has received less attention in the context of decision-
making for genetic testing. Such collaboration needs to
emerge not only as a result of the HCP providing informa-
tion to the patient, but of HCPs remembering that to pa-
tients, clinical information might be deprioritised in
relation to other emotional, social and/or personal con-
cerns, and therefore they may have less need or desire to
understand it. In our study, HCPs recognised this need. In
fact, there is a body of literature that argues moral stances,
or ethical perspectives and decision-making, are not a
priori. Rather, they are context specific and can only
emerge once individuals are placed into particular social,
emotional, cultural and/or personal contexts [35, 45].
This same literature states that in an institutional context
the relationships formed in these situations can affect
decision-making [35]. Extrapolating this idea would suggest
that a collaborative relationship (a relational approach)
between HCP and patient would provide a supportive and
caring environment for the patients so they feel they can,
with the help of their HCP, make the decisions that are best
for them, given not only the stage they are at in terms of
diagnosis, but also their personal, social, emotional and cul-
tural contexts. Without such a relationship, there is the
danger that patients may make decisions during consent
that do not best reflect their circumstances or wishes.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that this collabora-
tive effort should be dependent on certain HCP charac-
teristics. We note three here – trustworthiness, openness
and honesty – though note that others could be reason-
ably drawn from the findings.2 HCPs viewed them-
selves as needing to embrace such characteristics to
ensure the process-led approach to patient decision-
making remained respective of patient’s relational
(emotional, cultural, social) situations. Table 1 contains
definitions of these virtures, an example of how they
might help in a genetic tesing context, and illustrative
quotes from our HCP participants. These findings
resonate with notions of virtue ethics, ie., that there are
certain virtues that HCPs need to display to build a rela-
tionship with their patients and ensure they are consider-
ate of the consent process. Put another way, by drawing
on the virtues of, for example, trustworthiness, openness
and honesty identified in our analysis, HCPs can build a
relationship with patients that extends beyond informa-
tion provision, to one in which there is an understanding
of relational autonomy. HCPs can then engage with
patients in a collaborative process so that decision-making
becomes one of a shared experience, and one in which the
patient does not feel the burden upon themselves to make
the decision alone. This move towards applying, or at least
including, a more relational approach to decision-making,
which focuses on emphasising virtues and moral character
as key to ethical thinking, comes among the beginning of
a resurgence in this area of thinking [46]. It is a shift away
from the current rule-based deontological principles,
such as the four pillars [47], which, despite widespread
criticism [48–50], remain key to contemporary main-
stream medical ethics. Our focus here has been on
those virtues that emerged most prominently from our
findings, but other virtuous notions may also be rele-
vant here, for example, epistemic humility and/or patience
to wait for a less emotionally-laden time to go over con-
sent with patients.3
In spite of HCPs in genetic medicine recognising the
value of adopting such process-led relational approaches
to clinical genetic testing within their practices, such an
approach to consent is not yet viewed as best practice in
the field. As noted in our findings, one-off appointments
for consent to genetic testing and long information
sheets and consent forms are increasingly common in
the NHS (and feature in the 100,000 genomes project).
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A move towards embedding virtuous principles in a
more collaborative decision-making and thus more col-
laborative consent process also entails a move away from
the perception that the ethical basis of consent is always
trumped by the legal basis: more specifically, the percep-
tion that the legally protective way to acquire consent is
to give patients as much information as possible. While
we acknowledge that the Mongomery v Lanarkshire rul-
ing might make it difficult for HCPs to feel secure in
taking the approach we suggest in this paper, we have
stressed that providing more information to patients
does not necessarily mean better consent. We recom-
mend that our approach is adopted in practice.
Conclusions
Our approach provides a robust ethical framework suit-
able for HCPs conducting clinical genetic testing,4 More
research is also needed that takes an explicitly virtue-
ethics approach from the outset to move consent into
the ‘right’ direction. We hope that this article, and others
like it, can act as a concrete step towards inspiring
discussion and raising awareness about alternative ap-
proaches to consent.
Endnotes
1Broad consent provides only general information
about the characteristics of genetic testing to individuals.
It is commonly used in bio-banking, where it is impos-
sible to foresee what research the genetic sample and
information will be used for in the future. It is also used
to tackle the problem that a test can produce IFs. This
approach tiers, or ‘bins’, different types of IFs depending
on factors such as clinical actionability, so that patients
can chose which tier/bin they want to be told about.
2We are aware that the interpretative nature of quali-
tative research means that others may have drawn out
different HCP characteristics from our data set, meaning
that any analysis will be limited to the interpretations of
the authors. However, to enhance the confirmability of
our interpretations, and to ensure rigour in our research
methods, we analysed the data set within a team
Table 1 Definitions of three virtuous approaches to be adopted during consent to clinical genetic testing
Virtue Description of virtue Practicing the virtue in the context of
genetic testing
Illustrative Quote
Openness The spirit of open communication;
open-mindedness about decision-
making and ethical views
Giving patients unrestricted access to the
HCPs’ knowledge and information, even if
that means HCPs telling patients they do
not have all the answers; that they do not
know all the information; or that the
information is uncertain. Not hiding behind
providing medical ‘certainties’ or
informational answers to patients, but
acknowledging and explaining the uncertain
nature of genetic testing. Part of openness is
also talking to patients about the way
information might be shared - for research
or to benefit relatives and considering this
in light of patient’s relational
(emotional, cultural etc)
context.
‘You always tell your patient that’s
what you’re going to do and you’re
always transparent about what you
are doing and why you’re doing it’
Honesty Refusing to fake the facts of reality The HCP being sincere with patients, not
overstating the potential of genetic testing
or creating false expectations, and being
upfront about the uncertainty which
surrounds much genetic testing.
This differs from information-provision in
that HCPs make clear when they are
uncertain ie., when there is no information
to give per se, and also because they have
a conversation with patients, rather than
simply imparting knowledge
‘I think if you’re honest about it then
they don’t feel cheated’
Trustworthiness Being worthy of trust. People can
count on you to do your best, to
keep your word, and to follow
through on your commitments
The HCP building a relationship with
the patient such that the patient can
rely and depend upon the HCP. In
particular, the patient feels the HCP is
treating them with respect, and that
the HCP has considered the patient’s
social, emotional and situational
circumstances within their interactions
with the patient
‘I think it’s really important that your
patient feels that they can trust the
relationship that they’ve got with you’
http://stthomassource.com/content/2017/04/09/virtueof-the-week-trustworthiness-3/
Samuel et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2017) 18:47 Page 9 of 11
(including the duplicate coding by author’s 1 and 2, and
then comparison of findings).
3While other virtuous notions may be present, and
seemingly prominent, in the data set provided here, open-
ness, honesty and trustworthiness were by far the most
prominent virtues emerging from the data set as a whole.
4While concerns have been raised about the lack of
clarity virtue ethics provides regarding how to adjudicate
one virtue over another in practice, our intention is not
to view these virtues as a set of rule base principles, but
rather as a set of virtuous notions which HCPs can bring
to their discussions with patients when seeking consent
for clinical genetic testing. Any potential conflicts be-
tween virtues, if they indeed arise, would have to be con-
sidered in further research, informed by examples of
real-life cases in which they emerge.
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